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IMPOSTORS AND FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-DOES THE UCC
RESOLVE THE PRE-CODE CONFLICT?
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
the courts drew distinctions among factual situations which in common
involved an impostor's use of a negotiable instrument. The following
hypotheticals, labeled for convenience as (1) the typical impostor; (2) the
impostor agent; and (3) the innocent agent, illustrate three of these
transactions.
The Typical Impostor. A represents to B that he is C and induces B
to issue a check payable to C which B delivers to A. A indorses the name
of C and obtains the proceeds.'
The Impostor Agent. A represents to B that he is the agent of C.
Either C does not exist, or A is not his agent. B is induced by A to issue
a check payable to C which B delivers to A. A indorses the check in the
name of C and obtains the proceeds.'
The Innocent Agent. A induces B to believe that he is C. On the
strength of B's representations concerning C, D delivers a check, payable
to C, to B. B delivers the check to A who indorses it and obtains the
proceeds.'
The relevant section of the Uniform Commercial Code' does not
expressly distinguish among these factual situations although the Offi-
cial Comments to the Code refer to some of the factual distinctions.5 By
an analysis of prior law and a discussion of Code policy, this note at-
tempts to project the proper application of the Code to the issues involved.
1. See, e.g., Curton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S.W. 423 (1921) :
Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923). In this
situation the impostor often assumes the name and personality of an existing person.
See, e.g., North Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Kinsington Nat'l Bank, 328 Pa. 298, 196 Atl.
14 (1938). But not infrequently the assumed name is fictitious. Abel, The Impostor
Payee: or Rhode Island Was Right: 1, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 161, 180. See, e.g., United
States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, 274 F2d 366 (9th Cir. 1959).
2. See, e.g., Weaver v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Colo. 83, 330 P.2d 142 (1958) ; Mor-
ris Plan Bank v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Civ. App. Tex. 1941).
3. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Oak Cliff Savings & Loan Ass'n, 387 S.W.2d 369
(Tex. 1965).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405 [sometimes hereinafter cited as UCC].
5. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
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PRIOR LAW ON THE TYPICAL IMPOSTOR SITUATION 6
On the assumption that a collectible judgment cannot be obtained
against the impostor, the problem is whether to place the loss on the
drawer of the instrument or on the indorsee who took the instrument
from the impostor. One of these two persons, the first and second vic-
tims of the impostor's deception, will ultimately bear the loss although
the initial litigation may involve other parties.' For example, the drawer,
alleging a wrongful payment, may sue the drawee to have his account
recredited. If the court determines that the drawee has rightfully paid a
check, the drawer will bear the loss. If the court determines that the
drawee has wrongfully paid the check, the drawee has recourse against
the presenting bank on its guarantee of prior indorsements.' This pro-
cess of recovery over, based on indorsement or warranty theories,' will
continue along the chain of indorsements to the party who took the in-
strument from the impostor."° For purposes of simplification, it will be
assumed throughout this note that the impostor, after obtaining the
check, has presented it directly to the drawee for payment.
Despite the almost uniform result of placing the loss upon the
drawer," the courts have used a variety of reasons to justify their deci-
sions. Although the reasons tend to overlap and are frequently used in
combination with each other, they may be separately categorized and dis-
cussed as: (1) sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law;
(2) the intent rationale; (3) estoppel predicated on drawer negligence;
(4) the "ofie of two innocent persons" maxim; and (5) an underlying
policy of negotiability.
A. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
As the governing statute in most jurisdictions, the Negotiable In-
struments Law1 2 would appear to have offered the best source for decid-
ing the impostor cases. Although a few courts applied the NIL, 3 most
6. For the early development of commercial law in relation to negotiable instru-
ments see generally BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES §§ 1-3 (2d ed. 1961) ; 1955 2 N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9-10; Beutel, The
Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law, 51 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1938) ; Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instruments Law of the United
States, 34 ILL. L. REV. 137 (1939).
7. 2 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 6, at 239.
8. Abel, supra note 1, at 171. See also UCC § 3-417.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Abel, supra note 1, at 171.
12. This will hereinafter be referred to as the NIL.
13. See Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939)
Allen Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1941) ; Mont-
gomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920) ;
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courts agreed that it did not contain provisions applicable to the problem.14
The most popular section of the NIL applied by the courts is section
23,15 which declares:
When a signature is forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly in-
operative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a
discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any
party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature,
unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce such
right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority.1
Section 23 was used by courts taking the minority position that the
drawee should bear the loss." The rationale used in applying section 23
was that the impostor's signature was not that of the named payee and
consequently was a forgery." The vast majority of courts, however, re-
jected this reasoning on the ground that the drawer was deemed to have
intended the impostor to be the payee, 9 despite his false identity, and
thus his signature is not a forgery within the terms of section 23. The
inadequacy of section 23 is focused more clearly where the impostor has
assumed the name of a nonexisting person because, in this instance, there
is no one's signature to forge.
Some litigants attempted to persuade courts to use NIL section
9(3 -)21 which made a negotiable instrument payable to bearer when the
drawer made it payable to a fictitious payee whom he intended to have
Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901) ; Citizens' State Bank
v. Fuller, 274 S.W. 208 (Civ. App. Tex. 1925).
14. 2 N.Y. Law Revision Commission, op. cit. supra note 6, at 239; Note, 16 LA. L.
REv. 89, 116-17 (1955) ; Penney, A Sninmary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in
New York, 48 CORNELL L. Q. 47 (1962) ; Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code
on Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan., 53 MicH L. REV. 171, 177(1954). See Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939) ;
McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N. W. 542 (1926) ; Montgomery
Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).
15. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
16. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW § 23.
17. See, e.g., Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1939) ; Allan Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1941);
Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 At!. 296
(1920) ; Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901) ; Citizens'
State Bank v. Fuller, 274 S.W. 208 (Civ. App. Tex. 1925).
18. See, e.g., Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 At. 480 (1901).
19. See notes 24 and 25 infra and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1939) ; Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 At!.
296 (1920).
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no interest in the instrument. 1 This was uniformly rejected on the
grounds that the drawer believed the payee to be in existence and in-
tended him to have an interest in the instrument.2 2
B. The Intent Rationale
The most frequently sanctioned theory for assigning a loss occa-
sioned by an impostor involves a determination of the drawer's inten-
tion. As a debtor of the drawer-depositor, the drawee bank is obligated
to pay funds from the account to those persons to whom the drawer has
ordered payment.2 The true payee is held to be the person to whom the
drawer intends payment to be made. 4  But, when the drawer has issued
a check to an impostor, to whom has he ordered payment-the impostor
or the person being impersonated? A majority of courts have answered
this question by ascribing a double intention to the drawer: "(1) He
intends to make the instrument payable to the impostor with whom he
deals; and (2) he intends to make it payable to the person whom he be-
lieves the impostor to be. By the great weight of authority, the first is
held to be the controlling intent.. ."25 Having paid the person in-
tended (the impostor), the drawee may properly charge the drawer's ac-
count, and the impostor loss falls upon the drawer. 6 A minority" of
21. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW Sec. 9(3) reads as follows:
Sec. 9. WHEN PAYABLE TO BEARER. The instrument is payable to
bearer-
3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting per-
son, and such fact was known to the person making it so pay-
able ...
22. See cases cited at note 20 supra.
23. See National Metropolitan Bank v. Realty Appraisal & Title Co., 47 F.2d 982
(D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Merchants & Manufacturers' Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Ariz. 531,
14 P.2d 717 (1932); Polk v. Garrison, 162 Ark. 624, 258 S.W. 631 (1924); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Bimetallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229, 68 Pac. 115 (1902); Miners' &
Merchants' Bank v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 178 S.W. 211 (Mo. App. 1915)
Gallo v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 199 N.Y. 222, 92 N.E. 633 (1910).
24. Aigler, Bills and Notes-Impostors in the Law of Bills and Notes, 46 MICH. L.
REV. 787, 790 (1948).
25. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939).
Accord, Schweitzer v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 42 Cal. App.2d 536,
109 P.2d 441 (1941). Contra, Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480
(1901).
26. See Comment, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1218, 1220 (1961). Some courts do not dis-
cuss the double intent of the drawer but note only that the impostor was the intended
payee. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1891) ; United States v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 26 F.2d 493 (W.D. Ky. 1928) ; Cureton v.
Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S.W. 423 (1921) ; Moore v. Moultrie Banking
Co., 39 Ga. App. 687, 148 S.E. 311, aff'd, 172 Ga. 368, 157 S.E. 685 (1931) ; Russell v.
Second Nat'l Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (1947); Montgomery Garage Co. v.
Manufacturers' Liability Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920). New York has a
somewhat different rule. While using the intent theory, New York courts look to see
if there were previous negotiations between the drawer and the impostor in order to de-
termine that intent. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457
(1937).
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courts have used the double intent rationale to come to an opposite result
when the imposture is by mail. They reason that in the absence of face-
to-face dealing, the "controlling intent" of the drawer is to deal with the
person he believes the signer of the letter to be.28 Thus, the indorsement
of the impostor is unauthorized and the drawee who pays the instrument
cannot charge the drawer's account.2 9
The double intent theory has been condemned by many writers"0 and
some courts. 1 The critics argue that since the drawer believes the im-
postor and the person being impersonated to be one and the same person,
the two intentions cannot be separated." The drawer has only one intent,
and that is to deal with the person he believes the impostor to be."3 The
reasoning thus involves an obvious use of a fiction to rationalize a result.
C. Estoppel Predicated on Drawer Negligence
Negligence on the part of the drawer which estops him from assert-
ing the unauthorized signature of the impostor has also been used by
several courts.34 Under this approach, the drawer's failure to use ordi-
nary care in determining the identity of his p ayee,3 3 which substantially
increases the risk and responsibility of the drawee, estops him from as-
27. It is generally accepted by the majority that the same intent rule applied in
face-to-face transactions would also apply to transactions by mail. Note, 16 LA. L. REV.
89, 119 (1955). In United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, 274
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1959), the court stated: "It would appear that the impostor rule in
the law merchant first began in face to face dealings and later was extended to swindles
in the mail having the same essential characteristics."
28. See American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E. 436
(1933); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y.S. 1017
(1911), aff'd, 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914).
29. Ibid.
30. Professor Abel notes that the dominant intent theory necessarily includes the
proposition that "there are general principles governing liability in the negotiable
instruments field significantly related to or dependent upon the issue of intention." He
then notes that outside of the impostor cases intent is not used and that, when approached
realistically, the intent rationale fails. Abel, supra note 1, at 208, 230-31. See Note, 23
IND. L. J. 484, 490 (1948) ; Comment, 59 MIcH. L. REV., supra note 26, at 1227.
31. See Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480, 481 (1901),
wherein the court, in rejecting the majority rule, said: "It is a perversion of words to
say that it was intended for Potter [the impostor] simply 'because he had fraudulently
impersonated Haskell, and led the plaintiff to believe that he was Haskell. The plain-
tiff did not intend to let Potter have money."
32. Note, 32 ILL. L. REV. 731 (1938).
33. Ibid.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C.C.E.C. Wis.
1891) ; Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914) ; Penin-
sular State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928) ; Burrows v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Minn. 499, 90 N.W. 1111 (1902). See generally Abel, The
Impostor Payee: II, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 362, 362-72.
35. See note 34 supra.
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serting the impostor's forgery in litigation against the drawee."6 For ex-
ample, the drawer's conduct in the initial transaction between the drawer
and the impostor may be considered the primary error leading directly to
the loss." But this same rationale of negligence has been used in one
case to absolve the drawer of liability on the ground that the drawee was
at fault for not ascertaining the identity of the payee. 8 As contrasted
with the double intent rationale, the negligence-estoppel reasoning avoids
the fiction that the impostor's indorsement is authorized as that of the
intended payee.
But this approach can have only limited applicability to the impostor
cases as a uniform rule of loss allocation. First, it must be determined
on the facts of each case whether or not the drawer has acted negligently.
He may have taken all reasonable precautions under the circumstances to
identify the payee. Second, it must be determined whether or not his act
was the proximate cause of the loss. The drawee may also have been
negligent in not determining the identity of the payee. While negligence
should determine who will bear the loss, it is obvious that negligent con-
duct will not be present in all cases.
D. One of Two Innocent Persons Maxim
Sometimes the rationale for placing the loss on the drawer is stated
simply that as between two innocent parties, the one whose act has occa-
sioned the loss should bear the loss. 9 Several courts have held that a
drawer, who has been defrauded into issuing a check to an impostor, has
set in motion the machinery which will eventually lead to a loss and, con-
sequently, should bear the loss.4" This reasoning, however, has been
criticized as being a "pseudo-principle of law"41 which ignores the fact
36. Abel, The Impostor Payee: II, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 362, 367-68. Abel notes that
while delivery alone is not a sufficient representation to the third party to invoke estop-
pel, the conduct of the drawer might imply a representation that due care has been used
to ascertain the identity of the payee and in issuing the check. Id. at 371. See McCorn-
ack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N.W. 542, 546 (1926) where the court said
that the drawee may assert the drawer's negligence only when it has not been negligent
itself. The court then held that the plaintiff was not negligent in making the check pay-
able to one he believed was borrowing the money, and in any event, nothing that plain-
tiff did contributed to the drawee's paying the check.
37. See, e.g., Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764
(1914).
38. American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E. 436 (1933).
39. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 17 F. Supp. 611 (W.D.
Okla. 1936) ; Milner v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 Ga. App. 668, 145 S.E. 101 (1928).
40. Ibid.
41. Note, 23 ILL. L. REV. 701 (1929). This writer compared the one of two inno-
cent persons maxim to the situation where A leaves his bicycle in front of his house
and B, a stranger, takes a ride and injures C. A has put it in the power of B to inflict
the injury, but A should not be held liable. Ibid.
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that the loss was occasioned by both the first and second victims since
the impostor defrauded both.42
E. Underlying Policy of Negotiability
It has been contended that the preceding theories, other than estoppel
based on negligence, are largely rationalizations rather than reasons, and
that the underlying reason for drawer liability is actually predicated on
the desirability of keeping checks negotiable.4 The argument is basically
that negotiability is required by the business community to facilitate the
course of business by removing doubt or delay from the medium of ex-
change used in commercial transactions.4 If the defenses available to the
drawer were kept at a minimum, the result would be a freer transfer-
ability of negotiable instruments."5
PRIOR LAW ON THE INNOCENT AGENT AND THE IMPOSTOR AGENT
Under pre-Code law the innocent agent and impostor-agent situa-
tions were treated similarly. Thus, for purposes of simplification, they
will be treated together in this section and the logic applied by the courts
to determine the loss in the impostor-agent situation discussed infra may
be considered to apply to both.' 6
In the impostor-agent situation, where one receives a check by falsely
representing himself to be the agent of the payee and negotiates the check
by indorsing the name of the payee, the loss, as between the drawer and
the drawee, in the absence of estoppel or negligence on the part of the
drawer, is borne by the drawee."7 The courts have assigned two reasons
42. Abel, supra note 34, at 363.
43. Id. at 376-77.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 372-73. See also Strahorn, The Policy or Function of the Law of Bills
and Notes (pts. 1-2) 87 PA. L. REv. 662, 793 (1939).
46. For an example of the rationale of the pre-Code courts in determining the loss
on this particular type of factual situation, see First State Bank v. Oak Cliff Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 387 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1965).
47. See, e.g., Nat'l Metropolitan Bank v. Realty Appraisal & Title Co., 47 F.2d 982
(D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Russell v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868 (1911)
Buena Vista Loan & Sav. Bank v. Stockdale, 59 Ga. App. 798, 2 S.E.2d 158 (1939);
First Nat'l Bank v. Pease, 168 Ill. 40, 48 N.E. 160 (1897) ; McLaughlin-Gormely-King
Co. v. Hauser, 195 Iowa 224, 191 N.W. 880 (1923); Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat'l
Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 77 N.E. 693 (1906); Int'l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E.2d 249 (1948) ; Strang v. Westchester County
Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739 (1923); United Cigar Stores Co. v. American
Raw Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 171 N.Y. Supp. 480, aff'd, 229 N.Y. 532, 129
N.E. 904 (1920); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y. Supp.
1017, aff'd, 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914); Anglo-South American Bank, Ltd. v.
Nat'l City Bank, 161 App. Div. 268, 146 N.Y. Supp. 457 (1914) ; Armstrong v. Pomeroy
Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889) ; Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Chel-
tenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949) ; Storti v. Industrial Trust Co., 75
R.I 482, 67 A.2d 697 (1949) ; Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917);
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for this result. First, since the signature is not that of the named payee
the courts conclude that it is a forgery and that the drawee did not com-
ply with its obligation to pay to the order of the drawer." But this
"know your indorser" rationale would seem to be equally applicable to the
typical impostor situation. In both cases impostors have used their false
identities not only to procure the issuance of the checks but also to nego-
tiate or present them for payment. If one is bound to know the identity
of his indorser, he should be bound to do so regardless of the type of
fraud perpetrated on the drawer. When the courts have faced up to this
problem, they have answered it with the second rationale, which is the
fictional intent rule. As contrasted with the typical impostor case, the
drawer did not intend the impostor agent to be the payee. Rather, his
manifested intention was to make the check payable to the principal;
hence, the agent's indorsement of the principal's signature is a forgery
and the drawee's payment is unauthorized. 9
It has been asserted that the courts distinguished between the im-
postor agent and the typical impostor situations on the ground that the
agent case is one of false status rather than impersonation." This as-
sertion would seem to mean that a wrongdoer has falsely assumed an
Chism v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Tenn. 641, 36 S.W. 387 (1896) ; Guaranty State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lively, 108 Tex. 393, 194 S.W. 937 (1917) ; Morris Plan Bank v. Conti-
nental Nat'l Bank, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Civ. App. Tex. 1941); Greenville Nat'l Exchange
Bank v. Nussbaum, 154 S.W.2d 672 (Civ. App. Tex. 1941); Goodfellow v. First Nat'l
Bank, 71 Wash. 554, 129 Pac. 90 (1913). But see Weaver v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Colo.
83, 330 P.2d 142 (1958); Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 691 (1882) ; Eagan v. Garfield
Nat'l Bank, 118 Misc. Rep. 76, 192 N.Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
48. Russell v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868 (1911). Accord, Chism
v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Tenn. 641, 36 S.W. 387 (1896) ; Armstrong v. Pomeroy Nat'l
Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889) ; Guaranty State Bank & Trust Co. v. Lively,
108 Tex. 393, 194 S.W. 937 (1917). Some courts use the same rationale but apply NIL
§ 23. See Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d
768 (1949) ; Morris Plan Bank v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Civ. App.
Tex. 1941).
49. McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 838, 211 N.W. 542 (1926). See
Buena Vista Loan & Say. Bank v. Stockdale, 59 Ga. App. 798, 2 S.E.2d 158 (1939);
Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 77 N.E. 693 (1906) ; Rogers v.
Ware, 2 Neb. 29 (1873) ; Strang v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138
N.E. 739 (1923) ; United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Co., 184 App.
Div. 217, 171 N.Y. Supp. 480, aff'd, 229 N.Y. 532, 129 N.E. 904 (1920) ; Storti v. Indus-
trial Trust Co., 75 R.I. 482, 67 A.2d 697 (1949) ; 16 LA. L. REv., supra note 14, at 119.
An analogous problem to the one here being considered may be found in the law of sales.
Prior to the Code, where impostors induced a sale by the fraudulent use of identity, the
determination of the loss was largely determined by the seller's intent. See, e.g., Phelps
v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917). Where only an impostor was involved,
the seller was held to have intended that person to be the purchaser and the impostor
was able to pass good title to a good faith purchaser. Ibid. But where an impostor
agent was involved he received no title and the seller was able to recover his goods. See
Note, 38 IND. L. J. 675 (1963), for a thorough discussion of the impostor problem in
sales.
50. Abel, supra note 1, at 185-87.
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agency status without assuming the identity of a known agent, and that
this absence of impersonation would justify placing the loss on the
drawee. It is true that when the impostor represented himself to be the
agent of another the courts would place the loss on the drawee rather
than on the drawer."1 But the reason for the difference in result, as
enunciated by the courts, was that the drawer did not intend the "agent"
to be the payee. 2  There seems little reason, however, for making the
distinction that in the impostor agent cases there is no impersonation.
Courts usually have not reached a difference in result in the typical im-
postor situation where the impostor has assumed a fictitious name of a
nonexistent person," a case in which there would seem to be no imper-
sonation. Whether it is the typical impostor situation or the impostor-
agent situation, there can be elements of false impersonation and assump-
tion of status in each. This would be especially true where the agent
whose identity has been assumed has a well-known reputation. Since the
impostor cases have not required the element of impersonation, in the
sense of the assumption of the identity of a known person, the asserted
distinction between impersonation and assumption of status would seem
unwarranted.
Arguably, the asserted distinction may be interpreted to mean that
there is no impersonation of the payee. The question remains, however,
what difference does the difference make? The distinction between status
and impersonation does not seem, at least self-evidently, a sufficient rea-
son for different results. In both cases a wrongdoer has duped a drawer
into making and delivering a negotiable instrument and the determination
of where to place the resulting loss should not be controlled by the type of
misrepresentations made to the drawer.
Perhaps the validity of the distinction between the impostor agent
and typical impostor situations can best be tested by comparing the ef-
fects of the two types of fraud on the two classes of victims--drawers
and drawees. When the instrument is negotiated or presented to the
drawee for payment, it will appear precisely the same whether the wrong-
doer obtained it from the drawer by representing himself to be the agent
of the payee or by impersonating the payee. In each case, the wrongdoer
has fraudulently indorsed the payee's name. Neither the instrument nor
the circumstances of its transfer to the drawee will reveal any difference
as to the means by which it was obtained from the drawer. Whether or
51. See, e.g., McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 838, 211 N.W. 542
(1926); Strang v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739 (1923).
52. Ibid.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 274
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1959).
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not the wrongdoer was initially an impostor agent or an impostor payee,
his success in defrauding the drawee depends on his ability to convince
the drawee that he is the payee. Thus, if the difference in type of fraud
is to lead to a difference in assigning the loss, the justification must be
found in the transaction between the wrongdoer and the drawer, not the
wrongdoer and the drawee.
From the standpoint of the drawer, the question is raised under the
pre-Code law of why should the drawer win when deceived by a person
claiming to be an agent of the payee, and lose when deceived by a person
claiming to be the payee? The difference in result seems arbitrary. Dif-
frential treatment might be premised on the ground that the drawer has
a greater or lesser opportunity to prevent the one type of fraud as opposed
to the other. One might argue that a drawer may verify a claimed agency
status by the simple expedient of contacting the payee. By contrast, the
drawer's opportunity to expose an impostor is limited, as a practical mat-
ter, to examining the identification credentials of the person claiming to
be the payee. Since the accomplished impostor will be well prepared for
this eventuality, the drawer's actions are unlikely to succeed in discover-
ing the fraud. Under this reasoning, the pre-Code law leads to the an-
omalous result that the drawer wins when deceived by an easily dis-
coverable fraud, and loses when deceived by a difficult-to-discover fraud.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code treats the impostor situation in
section 3-405(1) (a) :
Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee.
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named
payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by the use of the mails or otherwise has
induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument
to him or his confederate in the name of the
54payee ... .
As applied to the typical impostor situation, the Code affirms the
results of prior case law by making the impostor's indorsement effective.
The important innovation, however, is that the various and dubious ra-
tionales formerly applied to this situation have been eliminated. Not only
does a cursory reading of the section suggest this, but the Comments to
the section specifically reject the double intent fiction. "  This is in keep-
54. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(1) (a).
55. Comment 2 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405. See also Note, 16 LA. L.
REV. supra note 14, at 125.
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ing with the Code's consequence oriented method." The question re-
mains, however, whether the section applies to the impostor-agent and
the innocent-agent hypotheticals.
At first glance it would appear that section 3-405 would solve the
innocent-agent situation and reverse the prior law by placing the loss on
the drawer. Indeed, one court, in deciding a case with an analogous fact
situation, has so held." In that case, Mrs. J approached D, a real estate
dealer, and M, an attorney, concerning a loan on real estate owned by the
estate of her husband's mother. Her husband was administrator of the
estate. After a mortgagee had agreed to make the loan, which was to be
insured by the plaintiff title company, but before the settlement date,
Mrs. J informed D and M that her husband would be unable to attend
the settlement. In advance of the settlement date Mrs. J, who was
estranged from her husband, introduced to these men a man whom she
claimed was her husband. He conveyed the property from the estate to
themselves as husband and wife and they together executed a mortgage.
On the settlement date Mrs. J, D, and M went to the plaintiff title com-
pany to obtain the loan. On the strength of D's and M's assurances that
Mr. J had executed the papers, the mortgagee released the amount of the
mortgage to the title company which in turn issued a check payable to
both Mr. and Mrs. J. The check was presented to defendant and paid.
It was admitted that the indorsement of Mr. J was a forgery and that it
was not Mr. J who had presented himself to M and D, but an impostor.
The court stated that section 3-405(1) (a) is an exception to the general
rule of drawee liability for improper payment over a forged indorsement,58
and clearly applied to the instant case. 9 The phrase "by the use of the
mails or otherwise" in the Code expresses the policy that the imposture
can be by any means at all, and is not limited to transactions which are
face to face or by mail.6" The court noted that this construction is sup-
ported by the Official Comments which state that the result under this
section does not turn upon the type of fraud which transpired between
56. One of the major objectives of the Code is to make commercial law uniform
and realistic among the states by doing away with "legal artificialities governing busi-
ness transactions" and by requiring observance of reasonable commercial standards. It
refers to legal effects rather than concepts or theories. Goodrich, The New Commercial
Code, Fortune, Dec. 1949, pp. 183-84. Judge Goodrich, the author of the above article,
was chairman of the drafting board and Director of the American Law Institute. Beutel,
The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 141, 142 (1951).
57. See Philadelphia Title Insurance Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 419
Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (1965).
58. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404.
59. Philadelphia Title Insurance Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 419 Pa. 78,
212 A.2d 222 (1965).
60. Id. at 225.
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the impostor and the drawer.6' But a question still remains since the
Code refers to an impostor who "has induced the maker or drawer . . ."
to issue the instrument. It has been contended, for example, that the
Philadelphia case stretched the meaning of "induce" to a degree not con-
templated by the drafters."2 This contention is based on the idea that
Mrs. J's husband, the impostor, did not "induce" the drawer to issue the
check, but was only the initiating cause of a series of events which cul-
minated in its issuance.6" The argument is that "induce" should be limited
by definition to direct persuasion and not extended to causation, since the
latter is a fact question which will lead to uncertain results.64 Whether
one agrees or disagrees with this logic, the Code, by the use of the un-
certain concept of "otherwise . . . induced," has left itself open to
various interpretations.
Concerning the impostor-agent situation, the question is whether the
impostor has "induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to
him . . . in the name of the payee." A liberal construction of the
Code65 would seem to place the loss on the drawer. This interpretation
is buttressed by the Official Comments. "The position here taken is that
the loss, regardless of the type of fraud which the particular impostor has
committed should fall upon the maker or drawer."6  Several problems
remain, however.
The first is whether or not the instrument in question was "issued"
to the impostor agent. "[U]nless the context otherwise requires, .
'Issue' means the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or a re-
mitter."67  A "holder" is "a person who is in possession of . . . an
instrument . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to
bearer or in blank."68 It appears that these definitions are of only limited
61. Ibid. The court also noted that it did not need to inquire into the drawer's
negligence.
62. Comment, 11 VILL. L. REv. 427, 430 (1966).
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 431.
65. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction;
Variation by Agreement.
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions ;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
66. Comment 2, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405. See note, 51 IOWA L. REv.
434, 438 (1966). See also Note, 16 LA. L. REV. supra note 14, at 126.
67. UCC § 3-102(1) (a).
68. UCC § 1-201 (20).
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utility in determining whether or not the instrument was "issued" to the
impostor. Taken together, they seem to declare that an instrument is
"issued" if it is delivered to a "holder," and that one is a "holder" if the
instrument was "issued" to him. In spite of their circularity, however,
these definitions do suggest that "issue" means a delivery of an instru-
ment to one who receives some right in the instrument. If this interpre-
tation is correct, it is arguable that "issue" is misused in section 3-405.
By the inclusion of this section in the Code, an impostor can effectively
negotiate an instrument, although he receives no iights in the instrument.
In the sense of a delivery to one receiving some right, an instrument
could not be "issued" to an impostor. This type of hair-splitting was
anticipated in the Code by the use of the phrase "unless the context other-
wise requires."69  It would seem that the context here would require "is-
sue" to be defined as "delivery." This would avoid confusion in both
the typical impostor and the impostor-agent situations by making their
indorsements effective after the instrument has been delivered to them.
The next problem is whether or not the impostor agent is truly an
impostor. Although the Code contains several sections of definitions,"
it does not define this term. One case, noting that there is no legal defi-
nition of the word, stated:
[A]t no time did we find that the court has ever sought or tried
to establish a legal definition of who or what is an impostor; a
reference to Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, unabridged, gives the lay definition of the word to be:
"one who imposes upon others; esp., a person who assumes a
character or title not his own, for the purpose of deception; a
pretender." This would seem to be a legally satisfactory defi-
nition.7'
In the hypothetical case under consideration, the impostor agent, by
assuming to be an agent, has assumed a "character or title not his own."
He has done so as a "pretender" in order to deceive. Quite clearly he is
an impostor, and UCC section 3-405(1) (a) would seem to determine
the loss."
69. See UCC §§ 3-102, 1-201.
70. Beutel notes that the Code has about 170 specially defined words. Beutel, The
Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L. J. 334
(1952).
71. United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 450, 454
(1948). The definition is substantially the same in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged (1966). For a discussion of the difference between a forger
and an impostor, see Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1365, 1367 (1962).
72. This, of course, is in the absence of negligence. It is assumed for the pur-
poses of this example that neither party was negligent. It might also be noted at this
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The Official Comment to this section, however, states that:
"Impostor" refers to impersonation, and does not extend to a
false representation that the party is the authorized agent of
the payee. The maker or drawer who takes the precaution of
making the instrument payable to the principal is entitled to
have his indorsement.71
Because the comments may be given weight in interpreting the Code,7'
this "addition"75 to the text casts doubt upon the general applicability of
the section. Two problems become evident.
First, has the drawer taken a "precaution" by making the instru-
ment payable to the principal? It would seem that the most obvious thing
to do when dealing with an agent is to make the check payable to the
principal. W'Vhy should the check be made payable to the agent? The
drawer makes it payable to the principal not as a precaution, but because
that is what the agent has asked him to do.
Second, it has been noted that no meaningful factual distinction ex-
ists between the impostor-agent situation and the typical-impostor situa-
tion.76 Under prior law a form of distinction was created by the use of
point that one case has stated that negligence is not a controlling factor under UCC
§ 3-405. Philadelphia Title Insurance Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 419
Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (1965).
73. Comment 2 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405.
74. It is noted in the Comments to the Title of the present Code that the Comments
are designed to aid in construction in order to promote uniformity. Comment to Title,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE; see FARNSWORTH & HONNOLD, CASES ON COMMERCIAL LAW
9 (1965). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102 (1952) stated that:
(3) In construing and applying this Act to effect its purposes the following
rules apply:
(f) The comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted
in the construction and application of this Act but if text and comment
conflict, text controls ...
This section was later eliminated. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1957). It has been
suggested that the Comments be given as much weight as an able treatise. FARNSWORTH
& HONNOLD, supra at 10.
One case has considered the effect of the Comments. While noting that the Com-
ments are not direct authority, the court did say that they were persuasive. Burchett v.
Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N. Mex. 575, 396 P.2d 186, 188 (1964). But the
court also gave a warning. "By giving approval to this Comment, we do not in any
sense mean to imply that we thereby are expressing general approval of all of the Com-
ments to the various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 190. "Nuances
concerning the precise weight which may be given the Comments must await further
litigation testing the issue." FARNSWORTH & HONNOLD, supra at 10.
75. There are many instances where the Comments either contradict the Code or,
more often, add something which is not in the text. FARNSWORTH & HONNOLD, supra
note 74, at 10. For a short general history of the comments and their use in relation to
the text see Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 CoL.
L. REV. 798, 808-09.
76. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
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the intent theory." As has been noted, the use of the intent fiction as a
factor to be considered in determining loss has been eliminated by the
Code."'
From the standpoint of the drawer under prior law, a strange situa-
tion existed. When dealing with an impostor the drawer was held to have
intended that person to be the payee and was required to bear the loss."
When dealing with a purported agent, however, the drawer was free to
ignore the consequences of his act and the loss was shifted to the drawee
or the second victim of the fraud."0 From the standpoint of the second
victim the situation was even more confusing. The determination of
whether or not he was to bear the loss also depended on whether or not
the drawer had dealt with an impostor or an impostor agent. The prob-
lem, however, was that the second victim could not know the nature of
the transaction which transpired between the impostor and the drawer.
Thus the amount of care which the drawee was required to exercise de-
pended upon a transaction of which he was unaware.
As already noted, this difference in decisions was based primarily
on the drawer's intent."' The Code, in rejecting the intent fiction, has
attempted to promulgate a uniform rule for loss allocation when one deals
with an impostor. One would think that a drawer would be held to one
standard of conduct in drawing a check and that an indorsee would be
held to a certain standard of conduct in taking a check. This does not
appear to be the result. The typical impostor situation and the agency
situations are similar in that someone, representing himself to be another,
has duped a victim into drawing a check payable to a person with whom
the impostor has no connection. From the standpoint of either the
drawer or the indorsee there is no meaningful distinction. The text of
the Code has not distinguished among "impostors." By the use of un-
defined terms and distinguishing the case of the false representation of
agency in the Comments, the Code has perpetuated a doubtful distinction.
CONCLUSION
Because of the national character of commercial transactions, the
need for uniformity of decision is apparent.8 2 Under the law which was
77. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
78. See notes 55-56 supra, and accompanying text.
79. See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
80. See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
81. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
82. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 3, at 12. See also Gilmore, On the Difficulties of
Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J. 1341 (1948). For a discussion on codifica-
tion, its purposes, and the problems of the NIL in this area, see generally BRITTON,
supra at § 3.
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in effect prior to the Code, the usual impostor situation on the one hand,
and the innocent-agent and the impostor-agent situations on the other,
were treated differently on the basis of tenuous and unwarranted dis-
tinctions. The Code perpetuates the problem by uncertain terminology
of the text and a dubious distinction in the Comments. In applying the
Code, the courts may therefore reach opposite conclusions based upon
the same factual situation. Because such a result is in direct conflict with
the stated principles and purposes of the Code, " the problem warrants
the attention of the Permanent Editorial Board which was established by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute to propose amendments when commercial
policy and practices make such proposals desirable.84
83. See notes 56 and 65 supra.
84. The Board will function under an agreement between The American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws dated August 5, 1961. Paragraph SEVENTH of that Agreement is:
It shall be the policy of the Board to assist in atttaining and maintain-
ing uniformity in state statutes governing commercial transactions and to
this end to approve a minimum number of amendments to the Code.
Amendments shall be approved and promulgated when-
(a) It has been shown by experience under the Code that a particular
provision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously requires amend-
ment; or
(b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation of a pro-
vision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the doubt; or
(c) New commercial practices shall have rendered any provisions of
the Code obsolete or have rendered new provisions desirable.
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLES 1-3, Explanation pp.
X-XI. See also Henson, Introduction, Recent Developments in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 Bus. LAW. 557 (1964).
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